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Climate change is here, yet even as states transition to green energy, oil remains supreme 
at both the international and national levels. Many nations around the world have based their 
economies on the production of fossil fuels, leaving these countries entrapped in the “resource 
curse,” often contributing to the development of autocratic regimes. As the world economy 
moves away from fossil fuels, these countries will be left with the question of how to transition 
to green energy sources. In this paper I examine how the approach to green energy 
implementation differs between autocracies and democracies. More specifically, I demonstrate 
the different tools these varying regime types have at their disposal for oil-reliant autocracies to 
transition to renewable energy sources. I find that autocracies are able to use their unilateral 
control to issue top-down directives for green energy policy and investment in a degree greater 
than that present in democracies, that they have a more streamlined process for deciding on green 
energy projects due to fewer veto players, and that they are able to reduce barriers to entry and in 











 On Thursday, December 5th, 2019, Saudi Arabia’s state-run oil company Saudi Aramco 
sold shares for what became the largest initial public offering (IPO) in history. The move was 
made in part to “wean [the nation] off its dependence on oil” (BBC News, 2019), which is 
reflective of the larger global attempt to transition away from oil. As it exists today, the 
international system is dominated by the fossil fuel industry. It fuels everything from our 
economies to the way our societies function, and it consequently has a tight grip on national 
governments, dominating how decisions are made. This grip has started to loosen, however, as 
the threat of climate change has become ever-more apparent. Boasting a clear scientific 
consensus and with more frequent natural disasters to back it up, global acknowledgement of 
anthropogenic climate change largely driven by carbon emissions continues to grow. As such, 
many countries have begun initiatives to reduce their reliance on carbon emitting industries, of 
which fossil fuel is the largest.  
One solution to this problem, at least in the view of many scientists (Turner, 1999; Elliot, 
2000), lies in renewable energy. By one account “renewable energy sources and supporting 
technologies are to be the cornerstone” (Scholten and Bosman, 2016: p 273) of a sustainable 
future. That being said, transition to renewables is not necessarily an easy thing for nations to do, 
as the reliance on the fossil fuel industry runs deep. Countries easing off of fossil fuels, 
especially those reliant on them for daily energy production and commercial needs, run the risk 
of weakening their existing institutions that rely upon oil revenue, as well as nullifying the 
infrastructure and jobs in place to sustain it.  
As the world shifts toward renewable energy, demand for and therefore the price of oil 
and fossil fuels will likely drop.  This raises concerns about how nations will adapt, given that 
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many derive the majority of their income and base much of their organizational structure around 
oil extraction and revenue. Existing research on how states adapt to green energy tends to focus 
on the states as a whole, but largely overlooks how individual nations will fare and why some 
can transition easier and more effectively than others. Further complicating this question is the 
fact that regime types – systems of government – often vary quite significantly between states 
with and without major oil revenue. Specifically, unanswered questions about the transition to 
green energy are even more pressing for countries where fossil fuels are the primary resource 
and where less-democratic forms of government exist. 
When it comes to regime type and renewable energy sources, most existing work focuses 
on the renewable energy deployment strategies in democratic, western states. This creates a 
rather glaring omission since autocratic regimes, particularly those reliant on oil, likely utilize 
drastically different methods. The process of transitioning to renewable energy is inherently 
different between states owing to their government structure and the available tools that the 
political structure provides them. By analyzing the current transitions in progress and the 
different tools used by oil-reliant autocracies versus democracies, the progress to date may be 
used to inform a theory on how different regimes, specifically oil-reliant, autocratic regimes, 
transition, one that other states would may be wise to follow.  
 My research largely aligns with the notion that oil-reliant, autocratic regimes have more 
power and methods to implement renewable energy than their democratic counterparts. I find 
that autocracies are able to use their unilateral control to issue top-down directives for green 
energy policy and investment in a degree greater than that present in democracies, that they have 
a more streamlined process for deciding on green energy projects due to fewer veto players, and 
that they are able to reduce barriers to entry and in turn increase the implementation speeds of 
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projects. Ultimately, the way that oil-rich autocracies transition to renewable energy is unique 
when compared to democracies, and capable of implementing change at a much faster pace.  
 
II. Existing Research and Unanswered Questions 
 In assessing how oil-reliant, autocratic regimes transition to renewable energy, there are a 
variety of different factors that must be taken into account. Primarily, these factors have to do 
with the broad impacts of climate change, regime type and resource curse, and the relationship 
between government structures and energy transitions. Climate change is relevant because of the 
risk it poses to existing governmental and economic systems, and the change necessitated by its 
emergence. Regime type specifically is impacted by climate change, perhaps no regime more so 
than those gripped by resource curse, which makes a review of how states go about energy 
transitions all the more important. Current research has outlined the threat of climate change very 
well, as has the existing work relating to the relationship between resource curse and regime 
type. There is little existing work that ties all these concepts together, however, and analyzes 
how climate change forces change in nations, specifically oil-reliant regimes, that otherwise 
would be more hesitant to do so, and how these regimes go about transitioning.  
 
Impacts of Climate Change 
Is climate change a real and pressing threat to nations around the globe? The answer, 
according to an overwhelming scientific consensus, is yes. This work by scientists is aggregated 
in the “Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Scientific Assessment,” which states 
that an increase in carbon dioxide emissions due to the burning of fossil fuels is driving a rise in 
the global average annual temperature (1990). Scientists estimate that if we stay at the same rate 
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in terms of carbon emissions, then we will see a temperature increase of 1°C by 2025, which 
would mean that temperatures are increasing at a rate greater than any seen in the past ten-
thousand years (IPCC, 1990). This temperature increase threatens to impact all aspects of human 
life through the effects of increasing global temperatures, rising sea levels, and biodiversity loss 
(IPCC, 2018), all of which are forcing us to reassess our current lifestyles and practices.  
Climate change poses a risk to many other facets of our world besides just our natural 
systems. In addition to its environmental effects, climate change has real, immediate implications 
for the structure of national governments. According to many scholars, such as Scholten and 
Bosman (2016), climate change factors are ultimately fueling major institutional changes like 
transitioning energy sources, weakening economic foundations, and straining political tensions. 
These mounting changes have the potential to undermine the existing structures of our society. 
As such, governmental acceptance and acknowledgement of the inherent risks of climate change 
prompts the need for countries to transition away from standard forms of energy to alternative, 
renewable sources. 
On top of the structural changes that climate change compels, it also has particularly dire 
impacts on the economic prospects of states producing significant amounts of oil and gas. Most 
notably, oil producing entities, both at the corporate and national levels, are being assailed by 
three existential threats: increased periods of low oil prices due to increased supply, the 
tightening of emission regulations, and lastly, the emergence of cheap and renewable 
alternatives, such as solar energy and wind farms. The most significant of these threats is the 
tightening of global energy policy, which in turn can make alternatives cheaper and more 
attractive (Ploeg, 2016). Within the last several years, for example, the price of solar energy has 
dropped drastically, making it far more feasible for countries to implement (Devabhaktuni et al., 
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2013). As it stands, most oil-producing states have failed to answer the question of how they plan 
to earn money when their resource reserves are either depleted or obsolete (Ploeg, 2016). Many 
have failed to invest sovereign funds into research and development of renewable energy, due to 
their own weak institutions and shortsightedness (Ploeg, 2016), leaving them with no diversified 
economy and few options for success.  
In truth, many oil-rich nations would rather not address the complicated reality of 
transitioning away from fossil fuels. Instead, massive oil exporters like the United States and 
Russia have remained dismissive of calls to change, despite the overwhelming scientific 
evidence of its necessity. This is largely due to the monetary benefit associated with oil and 
fossil fuels, which gives nations a vested interest in maintaining the status quo (Elliot, 2000). 
Moreover, it is much cheaper to continue using fossil fuels and maintain the status quo, than it is 
to undertake the costly state interventions necessary to implement green energy (Elliot, 2000). 
Even if the populace is interested in the change, moving away from fossil fuels and to a greener 
economy threatens to have “troubling impacts on trade and investment flows” (Cosbey, 2011: p 
31) Nonetheless, continued reliance on oil is not sustainable long term and countries have little 
choice but to face reality, and work to wean themselves off of traditional energy sources and 
transition to renewables.  
While not every country is actively preparing for climate change, the threat of its 
subsequent impacts on traditional energy have forced a vast majority of countries around the 
globe to acknowledge the need to transition domestically to renewable energy. International 
agreements, like the Paris Climate Agreement, have been agreed upon to achieve individualized 
goals. Moreover, there is active research being undertaken to assess how to successfully 
transition to renewable forms of energy, like solar within individual states. This is even true of 
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some states that are major oil exporters and currently generate high percentages of their GDPs 
from oil exports, such as Saudi Arabia, which is being forced to address the ways in which it can 
prepare themselves for a new energy future. 
 
Climate Change, Regime Type, and the Resource Curse 
While any state’s transition away from fossil fuels will inherently be difficult – owing to 
its stated economic and infrastructure ramifications – some will find it more difficult than others. 
For instance, non-democracies may find this especially challenging. The transition to renewable 
energy threatens to alter the status quo and undermine the existing government structures and 
institutions that have formed around oil resource extraction - making the necessary transition 
much less appealing. The complex problem of whether or not a nation will implement renewable 
energy cannot be answered without careful consideration of the country’s regime type and its 
reliance on fossil fuels 
Before going any further, it is beneficial to have a clear definition of the various regime 
types. To begin with, autocracies can be defined as a government structure in which an 
individual holds absolute power and the system of government for the country lacks any type of 
bureaucracy (Alvarez et al., 1996). Individuals within the state have no power or influence in the 
decision-making process. In contrast, democracies are the exact opposite, though not purely 
defined by political participation. For a nation to truly be considered a democracy, the citizenry 
must have a large amount of political freedom to express their own individual views (Alvarez et 
al., 1996), whether that be in support of a green energy transition or not. 
Of course, there are also many regimes that fall in between, with the most common term 
for these states being anocracies. Anocracies are seen as “semi-democracies”, with weak 
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institutions and rampant governmental ineptitude (Hegre et al., 2001; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; 
Vreeland, 2008). They exist in the phase between democracies and autocracies, and essentially 
display a mix of regime characteristics. Anocracies are often prone to corruption which can make 
them riper for exploitation internally and from foreign powers. As a whole, anocracies tend to be 
far less stable regimes than democracies and autocracies, and often give way to one of the other 
forms. 
Whether a nation emerges as an autocracy, democracy, or anocracy can be attributed to 
the respective nations’ relationship to resources and wealth. These variables cannot be 
overlooked, as the inherent economic and political implications that accompany natural resources 
are significant. This is especially true of fossil fuels, particularly oil, which carry with them 
immense monetary value. This supposed wealth has forced countries around the globe to grapple 
with an issue known as resource curse, which occurs when a state rich in resources struggles 
economically (Ross, 1999; Sachs and Warner, 1999; Collier and Hoeffler, 2005; Gilberthorpe 
and Papyrakis, 2015). The issue of resource curse subsequently plays heavily into determining 
regime type. 
Though a variety of factors are important in determining the governmental structure of a 
nation, perhaps none are quite as influential, or as well researched, as resource curse. This can be 
loosely defined as any state with an abundance of resources managing their economies poorly 
and, therefore, performing worse than less endowed states (Ross, 1999; Sachs and Warner, 1999; 
Collier and Hoeffler, 2005; Gilberthorpe and Papyrakis, 2015). In other words, the resource 
curse represents the failure of a state to successfully capitalize on the resource and its resulting 
opportunities in the long term, leaving the state poor and crippled despite the surplus of potential 
wealth. While notions of the negative consequences of resource wealth have been around since 
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the 1950’s, the theory of resource curse was first presented in its modern form by Auty in 1993, 
when the negative association between resource dependence and economic growth was 
established. Oftentimes, the introduction of a major resource leads to issues ranging from 
intervention by outside groups to wealth hoarding, all of which negatively impact the economy 
and government. This ultimately leaves states with weaker governments, institutions, and 
economies than they had before. 
More specifically, the resource curse affects both the political and economic functions of 
states. Economically, the resource curse and any economic growth largely influenced by a single 
resource have been found to hinder long-term development (Sachs and Warner, 1999). This 
leaves national economies over-reliant on a single resource. The abundance of one resource leads 
to overinvestment in the sector, starving other industries of the economic capital needed to 
survive, which hurts export revenue and job availability. Politically, resource curse is related to 
policy failures, with lawmakers focusing solely on short term gain and allowing the intervention 
of outside actors, in both cases opening them up to corruption and weakening their existing 
institutions (Ross, 1999; Hodler 2006). Frequently, government officials allow investment from 
outside actors for a share of the income. When outside groups are able to force their way in like 
this, they are able to extract an undue amount of the resource wealth, hoarding the money for 
themselves while depriving the state of much needed revenue. Overall, the impacts of resource 
curse on the heavily intertwined political and economic spheres of a nation are driven by the 
same resource, with the most common culprit behind the development of resource curse being 
oil. 
 When it comes to oil in particular, almost all oil-dependent states share certain 
characteristics. First, they rely upon resource driven growth and derive a significant percentage 
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of their wealth from the extraction of that resource. As a result, the resource dominates the 
country’s exports and grips domestic politics and institutions. Second, when oil is a states’ 
primary source of revenue, it is particularly vulnerable to changes in the world energy markets 
that affect oil value. Third, oil-reliant states are also likely to be less democratic when compared 
to non-oil-rich nations.  
Taken together, states that heavily dependent upon oil revenue often fall into the category 
of “rentier states.” As explained by Ross (2001) and Herb (2005), rentier states are those that 
derive a majority of their national revenues from a single resource, usually oil. These nations’ 
primary industries are all overwhelmingly consumed by a single resource, but they are successful 
in extracting a significant amount of monetary wealth from it, making them ripe for corruption. 
The vast amount of economic wealth potential presented by the oil resources available makes 
nations with already weak institutions vulnerable to further exploitation. Colgan, for instance, 
finds that the dominance of oil is clear in domestic politics, an issue that is often exacerbated by 
the prevalence of resource curse in most oil-producing states (2014). As he argues, oil income 
creates “petrostates” that are prone to corruption (Colgan, 2014), with officials prioritizing oil 
extraction profits over citizen welfare.  
The profits officials receive are then, in turn, used by the state to pay for citizen 
complacency through patronage in the form of rent windfalls (Collier and Hoeffler, 2005). The 
work presented in “Resource Rents, Governance, and Conflict” further expands upon the 
relationship between oil and corruption issues, including patronage, as established by Coglan. 
The work solidifies the idea of resource curse and rentier states, explaining how conflict 
develops as a result of the profuse of patronage and the weak, non-democratic institutions that 
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develop in these countries because of it (Collier and Hoeffler, 2005). Ultimately, these 
characteristics lend themselves overwhelming to autocratic regime structures. 
There is a plethora of literature that identifies that oil wealth is a strong indicator of 
resource curse, rentier states, and the development of authoritarian governments (Ross, 2001; 
Collier and Hoeffler, 2005; Colgan, 2014). As the development of resource curse and autocratic 
regimes is a long-lasting process, it allows for thorough studies, all of which reaffirm the positive 
correlation between autocracies and oil. Rentier states often take the form of autocracies, so 
much so that the relationship between oil resource extraction and autocratic regime structures 
can be described as a symbiotic one. Essentially, the wealth coming from the oil extraction 
allows a few individuals to consolidate and maintain power amongst themselves.  
Within these “rentier-autocracies”, the wealth derived from natural resources like oil 
typically accrues to a small group of elites. These individuals are then able to strengthen their 
own position through co-optive means, such as paying off citizens, or increasing military 
spending to keep citizens in line (Wright et al., 2013). These regimes are also able to shield 
themselves from a certain level of accountability to their citizens through their rent pay-outs. 
Additionally, oil wealth and high oil prices have the ability to strengthen regimes and have been 
found to have stabilizing effects on the government (Cotet and Tsui, 2013; Morrison, 2015; 
Korotayev et al., 2018). On top of that, oil resource wealth can actually actively hinder the 
development of democratic systems within a nation (Ross, 2001; Wright et al., 2013) which 
serves to benefit autocratic systems of governance. 
The factors listed above may present themselves in a variety of ways, but leave states 
looking decidedly similar from the outside. The prospect of oil makes it open season on the 
resources of the nation, with outside actors scrambling to get a piece of the pie. The existing 
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weak state either is unable to stop this influx of outsiders or is complicit in their involvement. Oil 
pours from the ground and goes straight into the coffers of corrupt officials and foreign 
companies, bypassing the citizens and government who often desperately need the money. Other 
industries falter as much needed investment is directed to the extraction of the resource, causing 
economies to deteriorate and local resources to evaporate. This results in the governing body 
being weakened further, at which point a few individuals may be able to consolidate power and 
install a less-democratic system of government.  The resulting autocracy is one that is wholly 
dependent upon oil as its primary form of industry, as well as its primary export, but is able to 
capitalize on the resources enough to keep its citizens at bay. This makes the state beholden to 
the swings in global oil prices (Korotayev et al., 2018), which can have significant destabilizing 
effects and are likely to be more common as climate change worsens and global powers move 
away from oil. 
In sum, non-democracies face an especially complicated path forward regarding their 
transition to renewable energy, as their regime structures are often inherently intertwined with 
reliance on the resource. Autocratic, dictatorial regimes may specifically find this challenging, as 
these nations are frequently rampant with issues relating to resource curse. Oftentimes, these 
countries develop into rentier states, using the resource wealth to strengthen the government and 
keep its citizens at bay. The existing research is very thorough, which assists in developing a 
conception of the states and their relationships to oil. That being said, it provides few 
explanations for how these nations may react to an outside threat like that of climate change, 
instead focusing primarily on civil wars and domestic interference. How rentier-autocracies 
ultimately react depends upon how these governance structures interact and carry out transitions. 
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Governance Structures and Energy Transitions 
It is well-established that oil wealth is strongly linked to regime type, and rentier-
autocracies in particular, but there is an equally important link between government type and the 
implementation of green energy programs. By this, I mean that the way a government is 
organized heavily impacts the methods it uses to transition its energy sources. In effect, 
depending on the structure of the state’s political institutions, a nation may have more, or fewer, 
resources at its disposal to transition its energy sources away from fossil fuels to renewables. 
Different institutional arrangements and structures work in distinct ways to encourage or 
dissuade the development of the green energy sector. Some states choose to delegate their 
regulatory and decision-making authority to actors, often handing off their green energy policies 
to the will of private institutions.  (Lockwood et al., 2016). Others take a more hands on 
approach to governance and use their political powers to either support or preclude green energy 
development. 
Regime type is important because, at its heart, the movement toward a renewable energy 
system “is fundamentally a political struggle” due to the relationship between energy-politics and 
political power (Burke and Stephens, 2018: p 78). For example, green energy is often associated 
with strong democratic regimes and increased socio-political will, leading to the emergency of 
the term “energy democracy”. The political will to establish green energy is reliant upon regime 
type as well as economic structure, with the functioning of energy systems ultimately determined 
by the policy decisions made for implementation (Rutherford and Coutard, 2014; Burke and 
Stephens, 2018). Slight changes in political processes can lead to different and diverse 
transitional outcomes, such as how concentrated energy politics often hinder renewable energy 
transitions (Burke and Stephens, 2018). As such, there is no clear path for nations to follow in 
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transition to renewable energy and different regimes can result in drastically contrasting 
processes. 
Regime type plays a role in determining where, within the country, the primary driver for 
green energy transitions originates. In some structures, governments have more sway in deciding 
energy policy unilaterally, while others utilize more bottom-up strategies, in which the 
motivations for energy transitions begin with smaller departments or cities (Emelianoff, 2013). 
These differences in structure play a large role in determining how movements towards 
renewables turn out. However, regardless of where the movement originates within a given 
nation, the transition to renewable energy is a long-term event. It necessitates the gradual 
introduction of renewable systems so as to not harm the existing, resource-based, national 
economy, but to nurture the emerging industry, while simultaneously preparing the state for the 
future. It is a complex process, one that requires immense amounts of political will and power to 
form coherent policy and affect fundamental change at a governmental level. This type of change 
is not always easy to implement and can originate through different socio-political mechanisms 
depending on the existing government make up and regime structure. 
In theory, political power in authoritarian states is less restricted than in democratic 
societies due to increasingly-consolidated governance structures. To illustrate, consider the 
concept of veto players. Veto players are generally defined as “individual or collective actors 
whose agreement is necessary for a change in the status quo” (Tsebelis, 2002: p 19). According 
to this theory, countries with fewer veto players have a greater ability to change policy 
(Bayulgen and Ladewig, 2016). Democracies, in many cases, are intentionally designed to 
contain more veto players, so as to not allow one individual to have too much power. In contrast, 
political power is much more consolidated in autocracies, with veto power being held by just a 
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few individuals. As such, autocratic states have more autonomy over their decision making and 
have the ability to pursue any energy policies they deem fit (Bayulgen and Ladewig, 2016). 
Given this role in the decision-making process, the power constraints, or lack thereof, present in 
a governance structure can affect the degree to which green energy systems are successfully 
established. For autocracies, this means decisions can be made much more unilaterally, while 
democracies require decisions to be approved by multiple parties and organizations. 
Like their more autocratic counterparts, western nations recognize their energy 
vulnerabilities are being heightened by climate change. This subsequently encourages states to 
develop renewable and alternative energy sources. Democratic states as a whole tend to be more 
center-left leaning, meaning they are more willing to adopt climate change and renewable energy 
policies (Lockwood et al., 2016). Democratic states have also run into problems transitioning, 
however. At a grassroots level, citizens use their voices and demand to be a part of the decision 
making process, especially when the construction projects are local for them (Hindmarsh and 
Matthews, 2008). That being said, those same grassroots movements can work in the opposite 
direction as well and push for the construction of green energy systems. Some democratic states, 
such as the United States and Australia, have mandated the construction of renewable energy 
systems, but have been hamstrung by inconsistent policies at the state, federal, and local levels 
(Hindmarsh and Matthews, 2008). Essentially, certain democratic structures of government can 
obstruct action at different levels (Lockwood et al., 2016), making any attempt to transition more 
complicated than it has to be.  
In effect, existing literature on governance structures and energy transitions suggests that 
a state’s regime type heavily influences how it interacts with the energy industry, and 
subsequently, how they transition to renewable energy – if at all. There are a variety of ways in 
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which governments can, theoretically, support or hinder green energy development. This 
includes directly investing in the sector using its own funds, providing political incentives, and 
controlling the development of energy projects. In general, government ownership of energy 
projects is positively correlated with the project's success (Kim and Urpelainen, 2014). Similarly, 
there is a good amount of data compiled from the United States on how different policies can 
support, or hinder, the deployment of green energy. The three main methods identified as being 
effective are financial incentives, regulatory changes, and rules and regulations. One particularly 
effective method is for states to restructure their regulatory frameworks, which can influence the 
speed with which projects are developed (Menz and Vachon, 2005).  
Despite the significant academic and policy interest in both green energy and oil-rich 
states, we do not yet understand how oil-reliant autocracies transition to renewable energy, and 
what methods, if any, they use to limit or encourage development in practice. We also do not 
know how this process compares to green energy installation in democratic states, or how these 
distinctions may influence the success of renewable projects. Ultimately, bringing together this 
literature is important to help answer these remaining questions, as well as to establish a basis for 
my analysis. First, underscoring the very basis of my project is the idea that nations around the 
world must address and plan for a transition to renewables based on climate change, something 
they may be hesitant to do. From there, understanding oil’s hold on the political system through 
resource curse is important for comprehending the ways in which autocratic regimes form. 
Within the energy transitions themselves, it is important to know the various ways in 
which regime type can influence its implementation. As aforementioned, switching to renewable 
energy is a political process that requires a certain amount of political will, either stemming from 
the top, or bottom, of the national hierarchy. Moreover, the regime structure is crucial in 
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determining the tools and methods through which a government goes about implementing 
projects, ultimately determining the overall strategy for renewable energy deployment and the 
systems’ success. 
 
III. Theoretical Expectations 
How do I expect regime type to affect transitions to green energy in practice? To begin 
with, I take a deductive approach to my research, working down from theories on regime type 
and structure to how those factors manifest themselves in state-level actions to promote or 
preclude renewable energy production. I start by examining the larger constructs of resource 
curse and rentier states, looking at theories of regime type to establish baseline definitions of 
different regimes, specifically autocracies and democracies. This is heavily informed by the 
“Classifying Political Regimes” work of Alvarez et al. (1996). From there, I isolate specific 
regime characteristics that the frameworks mentioned, such as veto power, to gain an 
understanding of structural factors that may benefit, or hinder, the successful deployment of 
renewable technologies. 
In brief, I argue that while oil-rich autocracies may be more hesitant to transition to 
renewable energy sources due to their relationship to fossil fuels, once they do decide to 
transition, they will find it easier to do so than their democratic counterparts. The ease of the 
process and the initial hesitance is primarily a result of the regime type and the oil-reliance of the 
nation. I am therefore primarily interested in how two separate variables affect transition to green 
energy: regime type and oil wealth. I discuss each of these in turn.  
On the one hand, regime type is a given factor that can play a large role in dictating 
government strategies and success for the establishment of a green energy system. That being 
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said, there is growing research suggesting the global movement away from oil will have a 
destabilizing effect on nations (Cotet and Tsui, 2013; O'Sullivan, et al., 2017). While I do not 
explore the potential for regime change occurring alongside the energy transition and assess only 
stable regimes in this process, it should be evaluated in future research.  
On the other hand is oil wealth. Oil wealth, based on notions of resource curse and rentier 
states, has an integral role in determining the regime type of a nation (Collier and Hoeffler, 2005; 
Ross, 2001), so it is important to acknowledge the hold it has on any given government. Without 
doing so, it can be difficult to correctly understand how a state works to transition to green 
energy sources. By including this as a variable, I am able to account for rentier states and isolate 
their moves when contrasted with those of non-oil-rich democracies. 
Existing research suggests several hypotheses related to how these two variables, taken 
together, will affect transition to green energy. I test these in a comparative case-study analysis 
that I detail in the following section.  
First, oil-rich autocracies should have more authority to forcefully dictate how their 
markets should behave and what industries should be invested in. Decisions about green energy 
more commonly originate from national leaders, who have more power to encourage or force the 
companies within their jurisdiction to follow the government’s lead. If true, I expect to see 
autocratic states issuing clear directives on how they want companies and organizations to 
approach the climate crisis, be it through the implementation of proactive policies or a 
reaffirmation of the status quo. Autocracies and their leaders will use their unique control of the 
nation to decide how the country’s industries will respond. That being said, due to the inherent 
government interest in maintaining the oil production of rentier states, I expect to see posturing 
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towards change, but less meaningful action actually occurring. While projects and lofty goals 
may be announced, they likely have little follow through.  
Second, oil-rich autocracies have more methods at their disposal to either implement, or 
prevent the development of, green energy systems. This essentially means that autocracies have 
much more authority to fast-track projects or unilaterally stop them, as the renewable energy 
position or strategy is determined by the dictator, rather than through a government agency or 
legislative body. In an autocracy, there are fewer decision makers with power, aka veto players, 
meaning projects can be greenlit at the desires of a few select individuals. Similarly, autocracies 
can stop projects without providing much explanation behind their reasoning. In an autocratic 
state, this system is likely realized with a streamlined approval process that ultimately goes back 
to the same key individuals. In effect, this means one should observe a much smaller review 
process with a few key individuals making the decisions in relation to projects. 
Third, in autocracies, there is quicker implementation of projects at far cheaper prices 
than renewable energy projects carried out in democracies. Renewable energy projects in 
democracies are subject to a large amount of review, frequent delays, and alterations due to 
citizen and legislative input. Autocracies face no such restrictions in their decision-making 
process and have a higher degree of control in terms of dictating entry costs and barriers. As 
such, one would expect to see much more expedient projects in autocratic states when compared 
with those in democracies. Moreover, it would be unlikely to find projects stuck in review or 
approval processes, as the state can decide how to proceed without necessarily having to hear 
from other parties. That being said, corruption is also an important factor to acknowledge in 
energy projects in autocracies. Corruption levels tend to be higher in oil-rich autocracies (Ross, 
2001; Herb, 2005; Colgan, 2014), a factor that has the potential to drive up construction costs 
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and extend the timeframe of projects. While undoubtedly a factor, I expect the impact will not be 
great, as the projects are high priority for the governments and will still be completed at far lower 
rates and much quicker than in democratic nations.  
Essentially, my hypotheses can be translated in three major observable implications that I 
expect to see if a nation is classified as an autocracy and is largely oil-reliant. Firstly, oil-reliant 
non-democracies have a large amount of control of their economies, which they use to dissuade 
from large investments in renewables. They have more authority to direct the economic focus of 
the nation. Secondly, these rentier-autocracies have a quick approval process for projects as there 
are only a handful of key officials that must approve of it. Lastly, oil-reliant, non-democracies 
have, when they do decide to implement renewable energy systems, quick completion times and 
lower costs for projects than their democratic counterparts. The lower costs and quicker times are 
primarily a result of lower cost labor and decreased barriers to entry for renewable markets in 
autocracies. All three of these observable implications are how I expect an oil-reliant, autocratic 
regime to transition to renewable energy. Each method listed through which they may support or 
hinder renewable energy projects are generally unique to autocracies. As such, we will see them 
deployment most frequently, or at least to a higher degree, in autocracies as opposed to 
democracies.  
Owing to the lack of existing research, testing my hypotheses– about how regime type 
influences transition to green energy – requires investigation into the experiences of oil-rich 
autocratic countries.  In the following pages I present a research design that utilizes a 
comparative analysis of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Israel. Specifically, I examine how the 
implementation of renewable systems is being carried out in Saudi Arabia given the autocratic 
governance structure of the country, and compare that with the similarly-autocratic state of Qatar 
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and the democratic nation of Israel. By exploring the relationship between regime type and a 
state’s methods for implementation, I can isolate the specific methods oil-reliant autocratic 
regimes use to support or preclude renewable energy systems and how that process differs from 
other regime types, specifically non-oil rich democracies. 
 
IV. Research Design 
To test my hypotheses, I carry out a comparative case-study analysis. Three separate case 
studies allow me to identify the variations in tools and strategies for green energy 
implementation that are employed by different nations, as well as how the regime type manifests 
itself in such variations. In doing so, I am taking a qualitative approach by examining the 
characteristics of the regime type and descriptions of the regimes processes. In essence, I focus 
on the state specific methods within the process of implementation and development, rather than 
statistical aspects, such as cost, of such an energy transition. For this study, I examine Saudi 
Arabia, Qatar, and Israel.  
The primary focus of my analysis is Saudi Arabia where I go most in-depth regarding the 
government structures and functions that enable, and have allowed, the implementation of green 
energy within the last decade. This includes how the regime and government handles renewable 
energy, whether the projects are public or private, how they are permitted and approved, and if 
they receive government funding or not. Additionally, I assess if the process of implementing 
green energy is a top-down one, i.e. something stemming from a directive of the monarch, rather 
than an internal government agency. These are all factors that are critical to the development of 
new energy systems and are almost entirely dependent on the regime structure. Moreover, I look 
at projects that are actively being implemented to get an idea for their success rates in terms of 
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actually being deployed and put into use. By doing a deep dive into Saudi Arabia, I am able to 
clearly see the various factors at play and the government actions taking place.  
To better isolate the governmental methods of implementation, I conduct two smaller, 
“shadow” case studies of both Qatar and Israel. Essentially, I look at Qatar to form a most 
similar case study between the oil rich nation and Saudi Arabia. The most similar study is one in 
which I compare two very similar nations, with both in this case being Middle Eastern, oil-reliant 
autocracies. This type of study allows me to establish the methods in renewable energy 
transitions that are shared amongst oil-reliant dictatorships. Israel, on the other hand, serves as a 
contrast when compared in the same way. The inclusion of Qatar enables variables specific to 
Saudi Arabia to be separated from those that are shared amongst all oil-reliant autocracies. On 
the other hand, the comparison with Israel allows for the comparison of regime type influence on 
the process of energy transition. By examining a major renewable action in Israel, I highlight the 
major differences seen in the renewable energy deployment process in the given democracy 
versus the process seen in the autocracies of Saudi Arabia and Qatar. 
That being said, these studies are not nearly as robust as my analysis of Saudi Arabia.  In 
both miniature cases, I chose one specific interaction to assess, better helping me pinpoint the 
major differences and similarities between how the two regimes and Saudi Arabia handle their 
renewable energy development. Accounting for another regime type and factors that are specific 
to Saudi Arabia leaves fewer variables at play and unacknowledged, allowing for the 
strengthening of my later conclusions on how oil-reliant, autocratic regime types transition to 
green energy.   
I study Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Qatar because of the clear potential they all have in 
allowing me to ascertain the varying ways the regimes go about green energy deployment. Saudi 
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Arabia and Qatar have an extremely different government structure than Israel, making it very 
possible to control for the regime type and later highlight the similarities and differences in the 
implementation processes. While Israel is a parliamentary democracy with an elected Prime 
Minister, Saudi Arabia and Qatar are both absolute monarchies, headed almost entirely by a few 
powerful individuals. Additionally, the countries also have very distinct relationships to oil and 
fossil fuels. Saudi Arabia and Qatar are very good examples of oil-rich autocracies and are some 
of the world’s top oil exporters. According to the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) website, oil exports account for roughly seventy percent of Saudi exports and 
fifty percent of its GDP (2019). Qatar has a very similar economic make-up with fossil fuels 
constituting almost ninety percent of the nation’s exports according to the Observatory of 
Economic Complexity. In contrast, Israel relies significantly less upon oil economically, 
exporting a negligible amount of the product (CIA World Factbook, 2019), and again making the 
distinction between the three more easily accounted for.  
Despite the clear differences, the three nations also share some key characteristics that 
make a comparison of them appropriate. It is important to note that Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and 
Israel are all signatories of the Paris Climate Agreement, despite their differing relationships to 
oil, and have all stressed a public commitment to reducing carbon emissions. The countries also 
have similar potential for green energy. All are located in the Middle East and, therefore, share 
the same climate and have similar geographies, making the outlook for wind and solar 
productivity very similar. This is especially true of solar, which maintains a high degree of 
potential across all three nations. Due to these shared characteristics, I am able to account for the 
same types of technology because the feasibility of the various types of renewable energy is very 






Saudi	Arabia Autocracy Solar High Yes 
Israel Democracy Solar High No 
Qatar Autocracy Solar High Yes 
Table 1: The primary variables assessed in my case studies 
Part of the logic in choosing Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Israel stems from the easily 
accessible information about them, as sometimes it can be difficult to find, especially for 
autocracies. In order to properly explore the cases and answer my question, I gather information 
from a variety of sources, ranging from scholarly articles to government websites. I draw heavily 
from databases and peer-reviewed studies, notably the works of aforementioned theorists like 
Ross, to establish the theories of regime type and resource curse. Moreover, scholarly sources are 
also available which examine the potential strategies for clean energy implementation based on 
location and existing subnational factors. This is especially true of Saudi Arabia, which has 
numerous articles published about the feasibility and potential implementation of green 
technologies. Many of these works stem from reputable and frequently cited sources as well, 
such as Shafiqur Rehman. Likewise, scholars have also assessed the potential for large scale 
implementation of renewable energy, specifically solar, in Israel, and how such technology 
contrasts with that of oil and gas (Vinter and Slonim, 2009). 
For the case studies, I also draw heavily from news sources and government 
communications that contain information not yet published in academic reports about the 
planning, approval, and realization of green energy projects. Outlets like the Saudi Gazette and 
Times of Israel both provide information about the progress of current projects, as well as other 
investigative research, such as funding sources. These news sources can also be beneficial in 
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uncovering statements from high-ranking government officials, which can inform my 
understanding of where the initiative for such projects originated within the regime structure. 
National, state run websites further expand on government thinking. Documents linked to 
the sites outline the steps taken by the government to either dissuade or encourage development, 
as well as how to go about initiating a project, if possible. They can also reveal the tilt of the 
government, in terms of supporting climate change goals. Ultimately, the respective state-run 
websites for each nation, the Israeli Ministry of Energy, Qatari Ministry of Energy and Industry, 
and the Saudi Ministry of Energy, Industry, and Mineral Resources, all provide needed insight 
into state projects and sustainability goals. 
The following pages lay out the case studies as follows. First, an in-depth analysis of 
Saudi Arabia, which establishes a clear idea of its government processes and their relationship to 
renewable energy implementation.  It also includes a further review of the funding and 
permitting processes, and any other potential checks on development. Afterwards are two much 
smaller case studies of Qatar and Israel. These have a similar focus, just not as thorough as the  
Saudi Arabia case. All three cases run through the three hypotheses and subsequent observable 
implications to isolate the specific ways each regime handles renewable energy. Ultimately, the 
cases highlight the mechanisms used by oil-rich autocracies to help with the development of 
green energy making them much more apparent when compared to democracies. 
 
V. Saudi Arabia 
In many ways, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia can be seen as a microcosm for the journey 
that oil-reliant, autocratic regimes must take if they hope to transition to renewable energy. The 
modern history of Saudi Arabia begins in 1932, though the history of the region goes back far 
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further. In 1932, two separate ruling families bonded together to form the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia. Recognized internationally almost immediately, the young nation began forming close 
relationships with western nations like the United States and Britain. Oil was discovered in the 
region in 1938, leading to an influx of foreign oil workers, wealth, and western ideologies. In 
1944, the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) was established as a joint venture by 
various american oil companies and the Saudi government (Teitelbaum and Philby, 2020).  
The rapid changes and incursion of foreign interests led to some tension within the 
country, especially as the oil wealth was disproportionately going to Americans. In 1958, the 
King’s brother Faysal, who was considered a modernist, assumed all executive power from his 
brother. Faysal is credited with establishing the nation’s first functioning and efficient 
bureaucracy. In 1960, Saudi Arabia helped in the foundation of the Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), an intergovernmental organization that coordinates the 
oil policies of its member nations. Moreover, under Faysal, Saudi Arabia began the process of 
nationalizing Saudi Aramco, bringing the company under complete Saudi government control by 
1980. While Faysal did not survive to see the complete nationalization of the oil company, his 
actions began a period of social and economic development that would bring Saudi Arabia fully 
into the modern world (Teitelbaum and Philby, 2020). 
Today, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is, by almost all metrics, still classified as an 
autocracy, with the governance structure reminiscent of the one established by the first rulers of 
the nation. According to regime data from the Polity IV Project, Saudi Arabia is given the lowest 
possible score of -10, meaning it is a full and total autocracy (2014). Other research backs up this 
notion, with the Kingdom consistently classified as an autocracy (Alvarez et al., 1996; Geddes et 
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al., 2014). In some cases, the nation is listed as a monarchy as well (Geddes et al., 2014), though 
that classification in of itself is considered a subset of autocratic regimes.  
In addition to maintaining its autocratic system of government, the economy of the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia still relies very heavily on the production and export of fossil fuels. 
Currently, the country is the second largest oil-exporter in the world, with oil exports accounting 
for roughly seventy-five percent of Saudi exports and fifty percent of its overall GDP (OEC 
2017; OPEC, 2019). That represents roughly 1.5 million barrels of oil a day (Domm, 2019), 
which gives the country around a 16 percent share of global oil exports (Twin, 2018).  
This reliance on oil, along with the autocratic regime structure, ensure that Saudi Arabia 
meets the criterion of a rentier-autocracy. As aforementioned, a rentier state is one which derives 
almost all of its wealth from a single resource (Ross, 2001; Herb, 2005), a characteristic that 
correlates heavily with the development of autocratic institutions. Though in some cases the 
abundance of oil has led to weaker institutions, the Saudi royal family has been able to utilize the 
oil wealth to solidify and maintain its power through co-optive means. The institutions that exist 
in Saudi Arabia today would not survive in their current form if not for the wealth of oil, as it has 
allowed the government to keep democratic structures and desires from catching on. 
The grip that oil has on the country’s international economic outlook and governance 
structure is similarly tight around other aspects of the domestic sphere of the rentier nation. Not 
only is Saudi Arabia a major exporter of oil, but the Kingdom relies almost entirely on oil for its 
energy generation. According to a 2016 estimate by the CIA, zero percent of the country’s 
electrical generation came from renewable sources, meaning Saudi Arabia has a long way to go 
to transition domestically. (CIA World Factbook, 2016). Moreover, as the Saudi economy 
swelled to 20th in the world, so too has its population and, in turn, its demand for energy. The 
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energy demand within the nation is expected to double by 2025 (Salam and Khan, 2017). As 
such, the country must work to rapidly expand their generation capacity, while also reducing 
their reliance on the current means of production if they hope to diversify. Current estimates state 
that if the demand does not decrease or the reliance on oil is not reduced, Saudi Arabia will be 
forced to start importing oil itself (Salam and Khan, 2017). 
As the nation is so heavily reliant on oil both in terms of their energy generation and 
economy, Saudi Arabia has been forced to acknowledge the issue of climate change. With the 
threat of oil price deflation looming, the kingdom has been forced  to “use its current wealth to 
prepare for a future with dwindling fossil fuels” (Hepbasli and Alsuhaiban, 2011). Essentially, 
the Saudi government has acknowledged this inherent risk of being overly reliant on a single 
resource and is actively seeking to diversify their existing systems. Yet, there is no clear path 
forward and there are multiple ways in which the kingdom is approaching the implementation of 
renewables, including through direction of the private sector and government investments in 
renewable energy technology and infrastructure. 
 Solar has been particularly important in their plans to wean off oil. The multitude of 
research and test projects that have been carried out have proven that solar has a wide array of 
practical uses for which it can be employed in the region (Alawaj and Hasnain, 1999; Hepbasli 
and Alsuhaiban, 2011). The outlook for solar technology in the nation is further enhanced due to 
its geography and climate, as “Saudi Arabia is located in the heart of one of the world's most 
productive solar regions” and has an immense amount of natural renewable energy potential 
(Dargin, 2009; Hepbasli and Alsuhaiban, 2011; Salam and Khan, 2017), should the country 
choose to pursue it. 
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All this information gives a much clearer image of Saudi Arabia. The country derives 
almost all its wealth and success from its natural oil reserves and, in turn, has used this money to 
solidify the power and standing of the autocratic government and the ruling family. The looming 
challenge of climate change and the collapse of oil revenues pose a substantial risk for the 
nations’ leaders, as investing in other forms of energy may stabilize their country's economy, but 
also threatens their hold on power. At the same time, the country and its geography make it 
uniquely capable of implementing successful solar renewable energy systems. In the end, the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, must, and is, acknowledging the issues facing them. The way that oil-
wealth has shaped the regime and nation cannot be overlooked, however, as it shapes the 
country’s response and actions going forward. 
 
Observable Implications 
 As aforementioned, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has developed into a powerful petro-
state, with a strong autocratic system of government led by King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, 
though the Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman, is the one who does the actual governing. 
Given this regime type and the reliance of the state on oil, I would expect several patterns to 
emerge in how the state operates with respect to renewable energy programs. First, I expect the 
nation to use the authority it has due to its autocratic regime structure to issue clear, top-down 
directives for how the private companies located within the country should, and will, invest in 
renewable energy. Second, the kingdom, also due to its regime type, should have a more 
streamlined process for deciding how to implement or invest in green energy. Finally, largely 
due to the streamlined decision-making process present in autocracies, I expect to observe fewer 
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barriers to project construction, resulting in more successful execution of clean energy projects, 
an aspect which coincides with reduced construction costs.  
 
Forceful Direction of the Economy 
One of the major ways that regime type manifests itself in a nation's transition to 
renewable energy is through the top-down policies issued by the government, with clear 
directives on how to approach and handle certain industries. This matches quite closely to the 
reality today in Saudi Arabia, underscoring the organizational and managerial capacity of 
autocratic states. As part of their plan to implement renewable energy, the Kingdom is 
controlling how the private sector invests and how they conduct business in the international 
sector, as well as investing billions to boost up nascent green technology industries at home and 
abroad.  
To begin with, Saudi Arabia has issued clear directions for how it wants private 
companies within the nation to behave. Currently, companies are instructed to invest in and form 
relations with solar entities around the world, as collaboration is seen as key for the kingdom to 
achieve success and leadership in the sector (Estimo, 2014). This is further emphasized in Saudi 
Vision 2030, which is an ambitious plan of Crown Prince bin Salman’s to enable the country to 
further develop and diversify, particularly in the energy sector.  
As part of Saudi Vision 2030, the government acknowledges that its economy may not be 
the most attractive for investments and is actively exploring avenues like privatization (Salam 
and Khan, 2017) to make the state more desirable. The plan calls for the privatization, or partial 
privatization of many industry operations, as well as liberalization of the green energy market to 
increase competition (Saudi Vision 2030, 2016). Saudi Vision 2030 also calls for “review [of] the 
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legal and regulatory framework that allows the private sector to buy and invest in the renewable 
energy sector”, in order to encourage further international investment (2016: p 49). Many of 
these legal changes are already going into effect, revamping existing structures - surrounding 
bankruptcy, for instance - in order to attract foreign investors and meet the goals of the Saudi 
Vision 2030 (Torchia, 2018). Part of the reorganization efforts launched by Prince bin Salman 
involved consolidating multiple competing entities into a new Ministry of Energy, in order to 
create a more “central, top-down governance structure” (Borgmann, 2016) for the energy sector. 
By making these changes and boosting private corporations’ involvement in the economy, the 
country aims not only to diversify its portfolio, but also to alleviate itself of some of the burden 
of transitioning.  
The Kingdom, for all intents and purposes, has “put its money where its mouth is” when 
it comes to renewable energy. In addition to encouraging private companies to invest in 
renewable energy systems and take part in the country’s transition, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
has invested large sums of their own money into the sector. In total, the government has pledged 
over $100 billion to developing and implementing solar energy initiatives (Parnell, 2019). This 
includes giving money directly to investment and development funds to partner with private and 
international companies. The authority granted to autocratic states allows the leaders to decide 
how to have broad control over the nation’s investments. Instead of any sort of budget that needs 
to be approved by another body, the government can decide which industries to prop up and 
support their needs. Crown Prince bin Salman has decided that it would be profitable to have a 
successful solar industry in the country and has directed government finances accordingly. The 
Public Investment Fund of Saudi Arabia (PIF), for example, has pledged money for research and 
development, as well as implementation of renewable energy systems and has entered into 
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international partnerships to do just that. Another fund, the Saudi Industrial Development Fund 
(SIDF), is offering loans for companies developing renewable energy projects (Nereim, 2019), 
making it easier for other countries to implement such projects.  
In further keeping with the Saudi Vision 2030, the kingdom is trying to distance itself 
from the industry side of oil as well, and took part of the state-owned oil company, Saudi 
Aramco, public in late 2019. This effort raised approximately twenty-five billion dollars, money 
the kingdom plans to put towards funds like the PIF and SIDF, so they can continue to fund 
projects and further develop industries (Kelly and Reed, 2019; BBC News, 2019). To be clear, 
the state does not plan on halting oil extraction and exports, but is just doing what it can to lessen 
its dependence nationally.  
The degree to which the Saudi government has been able to implement clear directives 
and investment priorities is partially due to the autocratic structure of government present within 
the Kingdom. The leaders, specifically Crown Prince bin Salman, have made clear the direction 
they wish the nation to go, stating “that [Saudi Arabia is] the only country that can make a 
breakthrough in the [solar] field and solar manufacturing field...because we have all the elements 
of success” (TIME, 2018).  Whether it is through expedited legal revisions of old laws or the 
forceful direction of international investment, the rest of the country has responded accordingly 
and done their part to make the industry successful.   
 
Unilateral Control of the Decision Making 
 Another way regime type is present in the renewable and clean energy sector in Saudi 
Arabia is through the streamlined approval process for green lighting projects, such as the 
Sakaka Solar Plant. Getting a project off the ground in a democracy can be a difficult process, 
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one that is significantly smoothed out in an autocracy. While the development of any project 
must go through multiple checks and reviews at a governmental level in a democracy, it has far 
less in an autocracy, in no small part due to the reduced number of veto players involved in any 
given decision.  
Given the very nature of an autocracy and its presence in Saudi Arabia, there are far 
fewer veto players involved in decisions of how to invest and implement renewable energy. As 
aforementioned, veto players are actors whose approval is necessary for change to take place 
(Tsebelis, 2002). Currently in the Kingdom, the Ministry of Energy is headed by a member of 
the royal family, Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman Al Saud, who works directly with the Crown 
Prince. As Minister, he is the one who enters into any agreements on behalf of the Ministry of 
Energy and can execute major energy projects, including those related to renewables (Ministry of 
Energy, 2020). As such, the Minister is largely considered one of the more powerful figures in 
the country, overseeing a massive and important department for the government, with few 
checks on his power other than Crown Prince bin Salman. The Minister carries out the vision 
given to him by the Crown Prince, with next to no other veto players, besides the aforementioned 
Prince, with control over how he does so. Beneath the Ministry of Energy is the Renewable 
Energy Projects Development Office (REPDO), where all renewable energy projects are 
submitted and approved. 
Even supposedly self-functioning departments ultimately report to the Crown Prince 
and/or Prime Minister. Take, for example, the King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology 
(KACST), a Saudi scientific research organization that works on solar technology. While the 
KACST is technically an independent organization, it receives billions of dollars in funding from 
the Saudi government and delivers reports directly to the Prime Minister, as opposed to any 
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agency or department (Hepbasli and Alsuhaiban, 2011). As such, the Prime Minister and other 
senior members of the royal family have broad authority to implement any changes they see fit 
(Alsultan, 2013).  
This authority does not just apply to starting projects either, but also to cancellations. 
Stopping a project in non-autocracies can be almost as difficult as starting one, due to political 
interests that are much less controllable in democracies. Most recently, in March of 2018, the 
Saudi government announced a massive and costly project to build the largest solar field the 
world had ever seen. Despite being touted by Crown Prince bin Salman as a “huge step in human 
history” (Safi, 2019), the project was cancelled by October of the same year (Deign, 2018), a 
decision that would not be made without the Crown Prince’s approval. Either way, there was 
likely little input on the project by anyone outside the oligarch’s sphere, something that can be a 
major factor in the execution of large infrastructure projects, like solar installation.  
The autocratic structure of the rentier state of Saudi Arabia has given the government a 
large amount of authority in terms of deciding upon projects and strategies for implementing 
renewable energy systems. By their very nature, autocratic governments have fewer veto players, 
with just a few key individuals, like Minister Abdulaziz bin Salman Al Saud and Crown Prince 
bin Salman making almost all the key decisions, being able to start or cancel projects, with 
essentially all major departments and projects reporting directly to them.  
 
Execution of Projects and Cost 
Regime type also tends to manifest itself in the way in which energy projects are actually 
executed and implemented. Theoretically, and based upon experiences in other industries, 
renewable energy projects in democracies are subject to a large amount of review, frequent 
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delays, and alterations due to citizen input. Autocracies generally face fewer restrictions in their 
decision-making process, resulting in more timely execution of major infrastructure projects. 
Furthermore, the close alliance between the state governments and fund-backed investment 
groups, like the Public Investment Fund of Saudi Arabia (PIF), has allowed Saudi Arabia to 
maintain extremely low prices for their solar megaprojects.  
The Sakaka solar project is one example of this. The Kingdom began construction on the 
300 MW solar project called Sakaka in 2018 and, just a year later, the project was fully 
integrated into the national electrical grid (Arab News, 2019). The timeframe for construction 
and the on-schedule delivery of the solar plant is particularly impressive, given its relatively high 
cost and the fact that it is the first industrial scale solar farm to be installed in Saudi Arabia. This 
is even more noteworthy given that a comparable solar field, Agua Caliente in Arizona, took 
roughly four years to be completely operational (Chakrabarti, 2019). Agua Caliente is similar to 
Sakaka, especially in terms of electrical capacity, as both are solar photovoltaic plants. Agua 
Caliente produces 290 MW of energy while Sakaka produces 300MW of energy. Though Agua 
Caliente does cover more land area, coming in at 2400 acres, a little under 1000 thousand more 
than Sakaka, the timeline for Sakaka’s completion is still impressive. From the start of the 
process, the Sakaka project moved far more quickly, as it was approved in 2017 and operational 
by 2019, while Agua Caliente was initially approved in 2009 (Campbell, 2019) and was not 
operational until 2014.  
 The speed with which the Sakaka project was developed can in part be contributed to the 
lack of public input required. While American companies must oftentimes hold public hearings 
on construction projects, especially if they impact citizens, the Saudi government does not hold 
itself to the desires of its people in the same way. This is further reflected in how utility websites 
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are laid out. In the United States, utility and energy company Eversource has an entire tab on 
their website dedicated to Public Hearings and Filings (Eversource, 2020) , an aspect that is 
completely absent from the company that carried out the Sakaka project, ACWA Power’s, 
website. 
 Moreover, the cost of solar in democracies like the United States is far more expensive 
than in their autocratic counterparts. Saudi Arabia recently began accepting proposals for a 
variety of solar projects representing 1500 MW of energy for a total cost of around $1.5 billion 
(Bridge, 2019) - $300 million dollars less than it cost to construct the 290 MW Agua Caliente 
project in Arizona (Chakrabarti, 2019).  Part of this price inflation stems from labor costs, which 
tend to be higher in democracies.  However, a majority of the increase actually comes from “soft 
costs”, like permitting and financing, that account for 74 percent of the construction cost of solar 
in the United States (Energy.gov, 2020). Not only are costs like those reduced in autocracies, but, 
due to the fundamental involvement of the state, other barriers to entry can be reduced as well. 
Essentially, companies bidding to install solar in the nation are backed by powerful investment 
funds, like PIF, with close ties to the state rulers (Kenning, 2017). This process has allowed 
Saudi Arabia to install solar farms with record setting low prices, making solar renewable energy 
even more viable going forward.  
 Due to the lack of public involvement in autocracies, Saudi Arabia has been able to 
execute projects more quickly, and more cheaply, than comparable projects carried out in 
democracies, like the United States. The KSA has used its authority to keep barriers to entry and 
permitting costs low to help project estimates come in cheap. Moreover, because of the close 
relationship between the government and energy companies in an autocratic state, Saudi Arabia 
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has been able to maintain low prices for their solar projects, a factor that serves as a major barrier 
in many states seeking to carry out large green energy projects.  
 
VI. Qatar and Israel 
 To isolate the unique variables in how autocracies, specifically Saudi Arabia, behave, I 
compare and contrast the nation with a very similar one, Qatar, and a polar opposite one, Israel. 
Both nations are located in the Middle East and have similar potential for green energy, yet their 
regimes types and their methods of green energy implementation are drastically different. 
 
Qatar 
 Located in the Middle East and bordering Saudi Arabia, Qatar is a small country around 
the size of Connecticut and one of the youngest countries in the region, only gaining its 
independence from Britain in 1971. Oil was discovered in the area in 1939, with production and 
export of the product truly ramping up in 1949 (Anthony and Crystal, 2020). It is currently led 
by an Emir, Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, who is the head of state and monarch.  
Qatar is a constitutional monarchy that, like Saudi Arabia, functions as an autocracy. 
Though Qatar may consider itself more democratic than Saudi Arabia due to the existence of a 
legislature, according to almost all metrics their regime types are very much one and the same. 
The autocratic regime status is all but uncontested and is supported by the work of many 
researchers, such as Alvarez et al., all of whom classify Qatar as an autocracy (1996). Similarly, 
the Polity IV Project gave Qatar a score of -10, the same as Saudi Arabia’s, and the lowest score 
possible, denoting it as a full autocracy (2014). Moreover, as previously noted, autocratic 
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regimes often coincide with oil wealth and Qatar, like neighboring Saudi Arabia, is also 
considered a rentier state (Herb, 2005).  
Qatar's GDP and exports are dominated by petroleum. According to the Observatory of 
Economic Complexity, refined and crude oil make up a combined 87% of the country’s exports 
(2020). As such, climate change and gradual movement away from oil is a major concern and 
movement into the green energy sector would be “advantageous” for the country (Doukas et al., 
2006). Moreover, the climate and geography of the nation makes it well suited for renewable 
energy development. Located in a desert area with a warm and sunny climate, Qatar is a very 
viable location for green energy implementation (Jahangiri et al., 2016; Martín-Pomares et al., 
2017), specifically solar power.  
Given the autocratic regime structure and the oil- reliance of the country, we can expect 
to see very similar interactions of oil-wealth and regime type on the implementation of 
renewable energy in Qatar. First, most of the existing policies in Qatar are “state directed, top-
down directives” that are decided by the ruling members, something that may have to change to 
diversify the economy (Ibrahim and Harrigan: p 22). The government has stated a clear 
commitment to diversifying its economy and plans to invest millions into renewable energy 
through its sovereign investment fund, the Qatar Investment Authority (Gulf Times, 2020). Much 
of this sentiment is laid out in Qatar’s National Vision 2030, a plan which outlines a process for 
economic diversification (2008). Though this vision places less of a focus on renewable energy 
sources than it’s Saudi Arabian counterpart, it still calls for economic diversification to avoid 
non-renewable resource (oil) depletion, and as a way to promote long term success (Qatar’s 
National Vision 2030, 2008). As part of the National Vision, Qatar also issued a National 
Development Strategy, that provided the path forward on how Qatar would meet the “broad 
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economic, social, human and environmental attributes of sustainability” (Ibrahim and Harrigan: 
p 4) Through this vision, the government committed itself to exploring other options for energy 
including renewables.  
Secondly, Qatar benefits from a streamlined autocratic government system that gives its 
leaders broad authority to enact their will, without the threat of veto players getting in the way. 
The Minister of State for Energy Affairs, Mohammed Saleh Abdulla Al Sada, is the supreme 
executive of that department and, along with the Emir and Council of Ministers, maintains 
supreme control of all “internal and external affairs” (Qatar Government Communications 
Office, 2020). Therefore, the Emir and the council are the primary veto players in the nation, 
with no energy project or policy going into effect without their knowledge and approval.  
Lastly, the regime structure of the nation also contributes to the quick timetables and 
relatively inexpensive costs for construction that the nation has been able to achieve. The 
nations’ upcoming Al Kharsaah solar plant, which was announced early in 2020, is expected to 
be fully operational by 2022. Moreover, the country managed to secure relatively low prices for 
the project, again due to the autocracy’s lack of labor protections and its inherent relationship to 
the state energy companies. The entire project, which will produce 800 MW of power when 
complete, will cost around $467 million to complete (Al Jazeera, 2020), or $100 million less 
than it took the democratic state of Israel to produce a 310 MW plant.  
Ultimately, Qatar and Saudi Arabia have many similarities in terms of their governance 
structures and their renewable energy strategies. Both nations boast an immense amount of solar 
energy potential due to their dry and sunny climates and both are autocracies led by a ruling 
family. This regime type manifests itself in the top-down initiatives for solar energy, including 
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the direction of investments, in the streamlined process for project approvals, and the expedited 
implementation of projects.  
 
Israel 
 Though still located in the Middle East, there are few similarities between Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, and Israel. Israel was established in 1948 when the state declared independence and 
created a Jewish nation (Ochsenwald and Elath, 2020). The new country was founded as a 
parliamentary democracy, meaning it is a democratic system of government where the executive 
derives their legitimacy from parliament, i.e. legislature (Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, 
2019). It is led by a legislative branch and prime minister, with citizens given the right to vote. 
Israel is generally rated favorably in regime classifications and is normally listed as 
parliamentarian or democratic (Alvarez et al., 1996). Likewise, the Polity IV Project scored the 
country as a 10, meaning it is a full democracy (2014). Currently, Israel is going through a period 
of economic growth under the leadership of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.  
 Like both Saudi Arabia and Qatar, Israel is considered a high GDP country, however its 
export market is drastically more diversified. Currently, petroleum and oil products account for 
only 3.2 percent of the nation's exports, with the largest resource export of the state being 
diamonds (OEC, 2017). While the country will absolutely feel the impacts of climate change, 
movement away from oil as an export is not nearly as devastating a factor for Israel’s economy, 
and therefore, the country may place less of an emphasis on the development of green industries. 
That being said, Israel today remains very dependent upon oil imports, but maintains a 
high degree of potential to develop renewable energy, particularly solar. Like Saudi Arabia and 
Qatar, Israel is located in a geographic region with warm, sunny summers, though it does 
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experience more rainfall than its eastern neighbors. Ultimately, however, the renewable energy 
potential is still high and the government has begun to take action on solar deployment.  
Given the democratic classification of government and the lack of oil wealth in the 
country, the transition to renewable energy in Israel looks markedly different than the transitions 
occurring in Qatar and Saudi Arabia. I expect to see more demand from citizens for action and 
involvement with less clear directives from the government, a much more rigorous and 
cumbersome approval process for projects due to the existence of more veto players, as well as a 
slower time frame, and higher costs, associated with solar energy projects.  
These expectations are borne out in the analysis. First, there are different drivers for 
renewable energy initiatives. Though ultimately all of these projects must be approved by the 
government in some shape or form, there is a unique distinction in democracies about how policy 
changes begin. The people who implement renewable policies in the Israeli government are 
elected by the populace of the state, meaning their views on climate change and green energy can 
be seen as a reflection of citizen interest. Moreover, there is much more citizen demand for 
climate action in the state than what can be observed in Saudi Arabia and Qatar. For example, 
citizens of Israel took to the streets this past year to demand action on greenhouse gas reductions 
(TOI Staff, 2019), in a demonstration that matches others like the People’s Climate March, 
which has become an annual event. As of the time of this writing, I have been unable to identify 
any comparable events occurring in either Saudi Arabia, or Qatar.  
Secondly the way in which projects are approved differs from that in Saudi Arabi and 
Qatar, with Israel’s regime type manifesting itself in the process through which initiatives and 
projects are approved. As a democracy, the country is intentionally and inherently filled with 
more veto players, which can have a significant impact on how quickly policy changes and 
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projects can be approved. As such, lofty policy goals that the country has set for itself have not 
been met, with the actual solar numbers being far below the 10 percent goal set for 2020 (Wacks, 
2019). The inability of the nation to meet its goals is in no small part due to lack of proper 
funding for solar projects. The money must be approved by far more people than just a few 
oligarchs in order to be allocated towards green energy development, with the Ministry of 
Finance designing, and the parliament approving, of the budget. Therefore, there is a large group 
of individuals that are allowed input into where money is allocated. As of right now, lawmakers 
in Israel have been hesitant to invest in renewable energy, instead opting to wait until the cost to 
implement solar drops significantly (Wacks, 2019).  
Lastly, the approval process is slower for clean energy projects in democratic nations like 
Israel, which contributes, in part, to far longer construction timelines. Take, for example, the 
Negev Energy plant, the largest one in Israel. The Negev plant began soliciting proposals for the 
project in 2008, with the project just coming online in 2019, a whopping eleven-year timeframe 
for a project that produces only 310 MW of energy (Solomon, 2019). At a price of around $570 
million, the project also cost millions more than similar sized plants in Saudi Arabia. On top of 
that, because the project took so long to complete, much of the technology used is outdated, 
leading to higher energy costs for the state.  
Despite its location in the Middle East and its large potential for solar energy 
development, Israel is far different than Saudi Arabia and Qatar, as a result of its regime type 
manifesting itself in different ways. While the autocracy in Saudi Arabia has given clear top-
down directives, Israel’s democracy has been far less forceful in their messaging and has 
mobilized far less to help implement solar energy. As such, it has made little progress in meeting 
its renewable energy goals, as its projects take years to complete and grapple with issues of cost. 
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VII. Results and Discussion 
After the congregation of this research, it appears as though my hypotheses about how 
oil-reliant, autocratic regimes transition to renewable energy have largely been proven correct. 
My first hypothesis, that autocracies issue clear top-down directives, was on the mark in terms of 
dictation of the market, which was generally observed as occurring in both Saudi Arabia and 
Qatar. That being said, I found that many oil-rich autocracies actually promoted investment in 
renewable energy systems far more than expected, especially the case of Saudi Arabia. Instead of 
stifling the growth of the renewable energy market, both countries are actively promoting it and 
attempting to make it easier to invest in the sector. The governments of both Saudi Arabia and 
Qatar have signaled their intent to take the issue of climate change and sustainability seriously, 
with both states issuing “visions” for their future that included goals for renewable energy and 
emission reduction. While democracies have also initiated plans to deploy renewable energy, it is 
often reactive toward growing citizen demand in the form of protests, something generally absent 
in autocracies.  Moreover, the autocratic regime structure did indeed give the nations ways to act 
that are unlikely to be seen in democratic nations. This is most evident in Crown Prince bin 
Salman’s unilateral move to reorganize the government and restructure all the energy industries 
under a new Ministry of Energy. What the Prince says goes in Saudi Arabia and he has been the 
driving force behind the nation’s push towards renewables.  
Having one or two key individuals, like the Crown Prince, make a majority of the 
decisions ties heavily into my second hypothesis. My second hypothesis, that autocracies have 
more authority to fast-track or stop projects, was corroborated in the case studies, as well. As 
expected, this was highly correlated to the amount of veto players present in autocracies. Saudi 
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Arabia and Qatar have much more streamlined governance structures than democracies like 
Israel. Decisions go back to a few key individuals, while in democracies many projects, or at 
least funding, must gain approval from a legislative body. Money driven issues specifically have 
bogged down many democracies, like Israel, with lawmakers hesitant to commit the needed 
funds to develop projects. Fundamentally, autocracies are much more streamlined, meaning there 
is more unilateral control of decisions, resulting in quicker approval, or cancellation, processes. 
 Based on the research, the speed with which autocracies are able to construct and 
implement projects appears to be quicker and more inexpensive, than similar projects in 
democracies. This lines up with the third hypothesis, that a speedier timeline for projects would 
be an observable implication of the regime type. Saudi Arabia has moved to reduce barriers to 
entry in the market, revamping legal operations to make investment easier. These oil-rich 
autocracies have also been able to construct projects like Sakaka and Al Kharsaah in time frames 
of a year or two, while democratic projects have had far longer construction times. On top of 
that, they have done so at a fraction of the cost of democracies, coming in at millions of dollars 
less than what is seen in democracies. Some of this is assuredly attributed to reduced labor costs, 
which in of itself is a manifestation of regime type. Autocratic regimes are less concerned with 
the needs of their citizens and more concerned about controlling them. As such, labor prices 
remain low. Building off of that, autocracies do not entitle their citizens with the power to 
comment on projects in the same way that democracies do, speeding up the project and likely 
reducing costs as well.  
 All three of these hypotheses assume and support the notion that these energy transitions 
are driven by the domestic regime. We generally see three different driving forces for energy 
transitions: domestic political and economic drivers, pressure to conform to international norms, 
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and internal mobilization through activism and protest. My research is almost entirely reliant on 
the first explanation, that energy transitions in autocracies occur because of the economic and 
political pressures posed from, most prominently, climate change. The way the government can 
lead this transition has been established throughout the paper, but it is beneficial to point out why 
the latter two alternative explanations for transitions are not as applicable to the cases examined.  
Firstly, while international pressure absolutely plays a factor in state decision making, it 
is far from the deciding factor. Being able to tout climate related achievements can be very 
beneficial for the government's public image and standing at an international level, but countries 
have been more than willing to flout standards before, particularly with climate change and green 
energy. With the Paris Climate Agreement, some major oil producers and polluters such as the 
United States and Iran have notably opted out, withdrawing and refusing to ratify respectively 
(Apparicio and Sauer, 2020). On top of that, it is safe to say that a majority of the nations that 
have signed, including Israel, have failed to meet their goals. As it is a non-binding agreement, 
there are relatively few immediate repercussions for failing to meet climate goals.  
Secondly, just as with news articles being unable to criticize autocratic regime 
environmental policies, autocracies do not allow for the type of environmental activism that 
drives energy transitions in other, less stringent states. While there is clear evidence of instances 
of protest in Israel relating to climate change and the implementation of renewable energy, no 
such records exist of any similar movements in Saudi Arabia and Qatar. This is largely because 
autocracies do not give their citizens the freedom to voice such opinions. Rentier-autocracies 
have notably poor records on human rights, which eliminates this explanation as a driver for 
change in autocracies.  
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 Ultimately, what the hypotheses outline is that oil-reliant, autocratic regimes tend to have 
multiple tools at their disposal to aid transition. Driven by domestic economic and political 
pressure, the development of renewable energy projects in autocracies benefits from the 
unilateral authority of the regimes’ rulers, from the small number of veto players in the countries, 
and from lowered barriers to entry, which reduces cost and implementation speeds for projects. 
The result is a much more expedient process than a similar transition in democracies. Renewable 
energy projects in democratic states are frequently faced with lack of monetary funding, must 
gain the approval from individuals who may idealistically disagree with the projects, and are 
bogged down by slow approval processes and cost overruns. Through the three hypotheses 
assessed, autocracies are able to avoid many of these drawbacks. Once an autocrat decides that 
the state is to transition its energy sources to renewables, they are able to restructure accordingly 
to fall in line with the states’ wishes.  
 
VIII. Conclusion 
 Looking at how oil-reliant, autocratic regimes transition to renewable energy was no 
small task. Facing the threat of climate change, many regimes around the world have been faced 
with the question of how to transition to renewable energy. Oil-reliant, autocratic regimes are no 
different, despite the fact that we may logically expect them to ignore the issue. The movement 
away from oil poses an existential threat to these states, imperiling the oil-wealth which forms 
the foundations of their economies and government. Surprisingly, I found that these countries 
were well aware of the threats they faced and were doing far from nothing. Throughout this 
research, it became clear that oil-reliant, autocratic regimes actually have more tools at their 
disposal to implement renewable energy and did not hold back in doing so. These rentier-
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autocracies, like Saudi Arabia and Qatar, have successfully utilized their regimes to control the 
economic investment, make unilateral decisions on projects, and reduce construction time and 
costs, all in order to help move their nations towards a more sustainable future.  
It is important to note that my research largely analyzed individual initiatives taking place 
in each country to implement solar. Given that the transition to renewable energy is one 
occurring in nations concurrently to this research, there is very limited data that can actually be 
assessed. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Israel are still in the early stages of solar development, having 
only constructed a few solar projects, if that. As such, my research uses the existing information 
from individual initiatives to form a picture of how the full transition may continue to occur in 
these nations' pictures. Essentially, it provides a roadmap for the tools we may see autocratic 
regimes deploy, versus those in democracies, to transition to renewable energy. 
Though the overall research has resulted in a clearer picture of how oil-reliant autocratic 
regimes transition, it is not without its limitations. It is worth noting that many of the news 
sources used to find out information about autocratic states must be taken with a grain of salt. 
Some of these entities are based in the autocratic countries themselves, where free speech is 
more restricted. As such, they may be more hesitant to be openly critical of any actions the 
government is taking. Furthermore, when it comes to the case studies, not all regime types are 
acknowledged and compared. Neither oil-rich democracies, such as Norway, nor non-oil-reliant 
autocracies, like North Korea, are represented in this research. Additionally, I do not account for 
the variations in democracy type that may contribute to issues of implementation, such as 
federalist systems versus parliamentary democracies. Each country and its governance structure 
likely has its own set of tools used to facilitate, or hinder, the growth of green energy. Further 
studies should include these other examples, so as to separate the various methods that are 
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unique to oil-rich autocracies. Moreover, future studies should do full case studies of all three 
nations, so they can definitively identify the differences between them at all levels, be it through 
permitting, approval, or the granting of governmental money. Additionally, the work does not 
address the feasibility of a given renewable energy source in each region. Rather, it just 
compares the steps already being taken to promote or inhibit the implementation of general 
renewable energy types. 
Another interesting fact that emerges from this case is how oil wealth provides needed 
capital to carry out the construction of renewable energy projects. In both Saudi Arabia and 
Qatar, much of the funding for renewable energy projects was provided through state sovereign 
funds, which themselves obtain their money from the development and exploitation of oil. So, 
while there is definitely a transition occurring, it is still reliant in many ways on the exploitation 
of fossil fuels. On top of that, in Saudi Arabia specifically, the country is deploying solar and 
other renewable forms of energy to assist in their resource extraction. The nations may see the 
need for change domestically, but they are not letting it affect their profitability at the moment 
and are continuing with oil production. Further research should examine this relationship, as well 
as the close relationship between autocratic regimes and their investment funds and banking 
system.  
Despite these limitations and further questions, the research does leave us with a picture 
of how differing regime types transition to renewable energy, which has significant importance 
and comes with certain policy implications. Once an autocratic regime acknowledges the need to 
transition, they have been able to do so very expeditiously. Oil-rich, autocratic regimes transition 
to renewable energy through the control that inherently comes with their regime type. These 
states, like Saudi Arabia and Qatar, forcefully direct the national economy, make unilateral 
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decisions on projects, and reduce construction time and costs - all of which are very difficult to 
do in democracies. As such, autocracies are able to adapt much more quickly to changes in the 
global energy market, including that of renewable energy. Democracies have a much harder time 
transitioning, or at least a much longer process in order to transition, meaning they must actively 
seek ways to speed up the process if they hope to move towards green energy early enough to 
combat climate change. That being said, most democracies still maintain a more diversified 
portfolio, something these oil-reliant, autocratic regimes lack. Even with their investments in 
renewable energy, nations like Saudi Arabia remain wholly dependent on oil for export. They 
must further diversify their portfolios if they wish to maintain their economies through the risks 
of climate change. Even now, they are susceptible to swings in the global oil market, with drops 
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